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A country's constitutional law is but a reflection of its politi-
cal, economic, and social life. Not unnaturally, the external con-
ditions of any particular period are bound to have their effects in
the legal sphere as well-especially in the field of public law.
This is as true of the United States as it is of other countries.
From this point of view, the constitutional jurisprudence of the
American Supreme Court is only the juristic mirror of the differ-
ent stages through which American history has passed. "Our ju-
risprudence is distinctive," said Justice Jackson on the 150th
anniversary of the Supreme Court, "in that every great move-
ment in American history has produced a leading case in this
Court."'
With these words, the present writer once began an essay explain-
ing recent developments in our constitutional law to a British audience.
To one familiar with the work of the nation's highest court, the quoted
statement is almost a truism. Any commentary on a Supreme Court
term is also a commentary on the life of the nation in that period.
The constitutional decisions of the 1977 Term, like those of pre-
ceding terms, mirrored the events of the period during which the term
took place. A widely emulated attempt to undo the effects of past racial
inequality gave rise to the most controversial equal protection decision2
since Brown v. Board of Education3 itself. Strains in our system of fed-
eralism were reflected in holdings on state power to regulate and tax
interstate commerce.4 Basic concepts of fairness that have come to per-
* B.S.S., 1944, College of the City of New York; LL.B., 1944, New York University;
LL.M., 1945, Harvard University; Ph.D., 1947, Cambridge University; LL.D., 1956, Cam-
bridge University; Doctorat d'Universite, 1963, University of Paris. Edwin D. Webb Profes-
sor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. Schwartz, Recent Developments in American Constitutional Law, in PREsENT
TRENDS IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 155 (Junz ed. 1960).
2. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). For a discussion of Bakke
and its implications, see notes 9-27 and accompanying text infra.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. See Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 98 S. Ct.
1388 (1978) (Washington business and occupation tax on the interstate commerce activity of
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meate society brought forth decisions on different aspects of due proc-
ess and equal protection.' Recognition of the crucial role of free
expression and a free press had a continuing impact on the year's series
of First Amendment cases. 6
During the past Term, the high bench remained a storm center in
our governmental structure. An observer of the Court cannot, how-
ever, but note with satisfaction that the controversy about the Court has
greatly diminished in intensity. In part, this has been due to the Court
itself, which has been remolding its jurisprudence to meet much of the
criticism directed against it. But even more importantly, this quieting
of controversy has reflected the acceptance among the vast majority of
our people of the need for the performance by the Court of its constitu-
tional role. With Justice Story over a century ago, most Americans
would still say, "The universal sense of America has decided, that in
the last resort the judiciary must decide upon the constitutionality of
the acts and laws of the general and state governments, so far as they
stevedoring conducted within the state does not violate the commerce clause); Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (Wisconsin regulations limiting the length
of trucks operated on state highways violate the commerce clause by placing a substantial
burden on interstate commerce where the regulations provide only a speculative contribu-
tion to highway safety). For a discussion of these cases, see notes 33-45 and accompanying
text infra. See also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 98 S. Ct. 2340 (1978) (Iowa single-factor
sales tax formula does not violate the commerce clause even though it may result in duplica-
tive taxation of the income of corporations engaged in interstate commerce); Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978) (Maryland statute prohibiting producers or refiners
of petroleum products from operating retail service stations within the state neither discrimi-
nates against nor unduly burdens interstate commerce and thus does net violate the com-
merce clause).
5. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978) (warehouseman's sale of stored
goods pursuant to a U.C.C. provision held not state action and therefore not a sufficient
basis for a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978)
(New York statute limiting appointment of members of state police force to United States
citizens does not violate equal protection clause). For a discussion of these cases, see notes
46-63 and accompanying text infra.
6. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978) (when a newspaper's First
Amendment interests would be endangered by a third-party search of its offices pursuant to
a warrant, the preconditions for the issuance of such a warrant, including probable cause,
specificity, and overall reasonableness, must be applied with particular exactitude); In re
Primus, 98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978) (collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to
the courts, which includes solicitation of prospective litigants by nonprofit organizations that
engage in litigation as a form of political expression and association, is entitled to First
Amendment protection and may be regulated only with narrow specificity); Landmark
Commun., Inc. v. Virginia, 98 S. Ct. 1535 (1978) (First Amendment bars the criminal pun-
ishment of a newspaper for publishing truthful information regarding the confidential pro-
ceedings of a state judicial review commission); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. 1407
(1978) (the expression of views on an issue of public importance is entitled to First Amend-
ment protection even when the speaker is a corporation).
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are capable of being made the subject of judicial controversy. ' 7 The
most significant thing about the Supreme Court is, after all, its contin-
ued performance of its constitutional function and the continued ac-
ceptance by the mass of Americans of such performance. This remains
a basic aspect of our system-as significant in an analysis of recent de-
velopments as it would be in an overall historical account.
Bakke: Opportunity Manqu6?
One who analyzes the work of the nation's highest tribunal well
realizes the truth in Cardozo's famous statement that the law has its
periods of ebb and flow.8 Certainly, it will hardly be contended that
the 1977 Term constituted one of the flood tides of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence. Indeed, compared to other recent terms, the one under
review may seem relatively inconsequential.
Yet, even "ordinary" terms of the high bench are not without sig-
nificance to students of the Court as an institution. If anything, in fact,
such terms may be of even greater value from the point of view of day-
to-day institutional functioning. Great cases, like hard cases, are prone
to make bad law. Cases decided in the glare of the cause cbi'ebre are far
more apt to distort the functioning of the deciding tribunal than those
dealt with under calmer circumstances.
During the past Term, the Court did decide one case that gave
every prospect of being a great case: Regents of University of Calfornia
v. Bakke.' Few cases in recent years have received the public attention
which the media and the country focussed on Bakke from its inception.
Yet, if Bakke "at the borning" seemed to have all the potential for an
historic landmark, Bakke delivered appeared to all too many to be a
judicial anti-climax. The Court, it was widely felt, had missed an op-
portunity definitively to resolve the most important equal protection
issue since that presented a quarter century ago in Brown v. Board of
Education. 10
At issue in Bakke was the special admissions program of a state
medical school, under which sixteen out of 100 places in the entering
class were reserved for blacks and members of other minority groups.
7. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1570
(1833), reprinted in 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1576 (5th ed. 1891).
8. Cardozo, .4A Ministry ofJustice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113, 126 (1921).
9. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Such persons were considered separately from general applicants. 1 A
white male denied admission brought an action attacking the program.
He alleged that the special admissions program operated to exclude
him from the school on the basis of his race, in violation of his rights
under the equal protection clause. 2 The Court affirmed an order di-
recting that he be admitted, but it reversed that portion of the lower
court's judgment enjoining the school from according any considera-
tion to race in its admissions process.1 3
The Justices were sharply divided in Bakke. 4 Four held that the
special admissions program violated the prohibition against racial dis-
crimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 Four others held that the
program for affirmative admission of blacks and other minorities vio-
lated neither the 1964 statute nor the Constitution. 16 The swing vote
was cast by Justice Powell, who agreed with the first four that the ad-
missions program, with its inflexible provision for sixteen minority ad-
missions, was invalid, and with the second four that race may be taken
into account as an admissions criterion. 7
Bakke appears to bar rigid preferences based solely on race. But
the same prohibition does not apply to taking race into account in de-
termining eligibility for educational or other public programs. The
state has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by an
admissions program that involves the competitive consideration of
race. 8 To that extent, racial classifications would be valid to ensure
racial diversity in governmental programs, even when there has been
11. 98 S. Ct. at 2739-41.
12. Id. at 2742.
13. Id. at 2764.
14. Justice Powell announced the two-part judgment of the Court. Four Justices con-
curred with one half, another four in the second half. See notes 15 & 16 infra.
15. 98 S. Ct. at 2809 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Burger, C.J., and Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.). They found that Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 applied and that Bakke was excluded from the medical school in violation of its
prohibition against the exclusion of any person from participating in any program receiving
federal financial assistance on the ground of race. They concurred in the judgment insofar
as it affirmed the California Supreme Court judgment ordering that Bakke be admitted to
the school. Id. at 2815.
16. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun filed an opinion wherein they
concluded that Title VI proscribes only those racial classifications that would violate the
equal protection clause if employed by a state, and that race may be used to remedy past
societal discrimination. Id. at 2766. They concurred in the judgment reversing the Califor-
nia Supreme Court insofar as its judgment prohibited the use of race as a factor in university
admissions. Id. at 2767.
17. Id. at 2739.
18. Id. at 2764 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Black-
mun joined in this part of the judgment. See note 16 supra.
[Vol. 6:1
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no finding of past racial discrimination. And when such a finding has
been made, the implication is that specifically race-conscious corrective
measures may be used. 19 In such a case, in order to eliminate the ef-
fects of racism, the law must first take race into account; as Justice
Blackmun puts it, in order to treat the victims of racial discrimination
equally, it must treat them differently.2" Under Bakke, the famous as-
sertion of the first Justice Harlan that "[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind"2=must be seen as an aspiration rather than a reflection of real-
ity.22 Until the effects of discrimination are eliminated, race may be
taken into account for remedial purposes.
This is, however, only the present writer's interpretation of Bakke.
One would have to be rash indeed to assert categorically that his inter-
pretation of the case is the correct one. The manner in which the
Bakke Court divided and the various conflicting opinions blur the
force of the decision.' "What is the law of the case?" is the natural
query of the lawyer after an important Supreme Court decision is
handed down. It must be admitted that it cannot be answered with full
certainty after Bakke. It may be, as John Winthrop expressed it in
1644, that "[jiudges are Gods upon earth,"24 but a pantheon that speaks
with such inconsistent voices hardly inspires the listener with the feel-
ing of divine certainty.'
One may, however, express a modest doubt as to whether a ringing
Brown-type unanimous decision would have really served the law bet-
ter. On so complex and divisive an issue, such a decision might have
turned out to be a latter-day Dred Scott Case 6-- tearing the country
apart rather than resolving the issue. The Supreme Court has been
well compared to the Delphic Oracle. Like that ancient institution, it
has owed part of its success to the often obscure quality of its pro-
nouncements, which can be taken to mean all things to all men. Sir
Maurice Bowra, speaking of the Oracle at Delphi, tells us that,
"[w]hoever controlled it was well informed on public affairs and knew
19. Justice Powell's opinion carefully distinguishes Bakke, where there was no finding
of past racial discrimination in the medical school admissions program, from those cases
where past discrimination had been established. 98 S. Ct. at 2757-58.
20. Id. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22. 98 S. Ct. at 2766. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra. In all, six opinions were filed by the
Justices in Bakke.
24. Winthrop, Arbitrary Government Described, 43 HARV. CLASSICS 94, 100 (1910).
25. See notes 14-17 & 23 supra.
26. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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that most . . . troubles are easily settled by common sense." 27 At its
best, the Bakke decision represents a common-sense approach to the
most difficult constitutional issue of recent years. At the least, it has
gained for the country and its Constitution a significant breathing
space, in which political institutions and public opinion can try further
to cope with the problem.
Good for This Day and Train Only?
Critics of the Supreme Court have directed continuing animadver-
sions against the Court's failure to follow precedent. They repeat the
famous charge of Justice Roberts, made in a 1944 dissent, that it is "the
present policy of the court freely to disregard and to overrule consid-
ered decisions and the rules of law announced in them."' 28 The result,
said the learned judge, in one of the few bon mots he ever permitted
himself while on the bench, is that adjudications of the Supreme Court
are brought "into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for
this day and train only."29
Certainly one of the essential attributes of any successfully func-
tioning institution is that of internal consistency and adherence to es-
tablished precedent. The principle of stare decisis is thus one which
tends to guide all reasonable human action. Yet, important though
consistency of conduct may be in other spheres, it is in the law that it
attains its peak of perfection. The very basis of law in a civilized soci-
ety is that it enables men in like circumstances to be dealt with in a
similar manner. But this can be true only if the law itself is settled and
applied consistently in specific cases. One can, perhaps, picture a satis-
factory dispensation of justice by Saint Louis under the oak at Vin-
cennes; yet who would be willing to submit his case to the uncontrolled
discretion of one other than a saint? In a developed system of law, the
individual will of the magistrate must be fettered by the doctrine of
adherence to settled principles and precedent. In a judicial tribunal,
stare decisis is not so much a virtue as a necessity.
In the nation's highest bench, however, adherence to precedent
cannot be the "be all and end all" of judicial virtues. If the Supreme
Court were inexorably to follow prior precedent in every case, stare
decisis would become the doctrine of the dead hand. As early as 1851,
the high Court itself saw the need for flexibility in its application of the
27. C. BOwRA, THE GREEK EXPERIENCE 61 (1957).
28. Smith v. Alwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 669.
[Vol. 6:1
Fall 19781 FOREWORD
rule of adherence to precedent."0 Stare decisis in our system is, in Jus-
tice Brandeis' words, not "a universal, inexorable command. '31 In
truth, the worst thing that could happen in a legal system like ours,
where the judge plays such a primordial part, would be to bind him
rigidly to all the rules fashioned by his predecessors. Certainty and
change-these are the essential needs of a legal system. Obviously,
they both cannot be given full scope; in their pure forms they are at
antagonistic poles. Neither can be made the exclusive concern of the
legal system. Without certainty, the law becomes not a chart to govern
conduct, but a game of chance; with only certainty, the law is as the still
waters in which there is only stagnation and death. Inherent in every
system of law is the antinomy between certainty and change. The law
must be stable and yet it cannot stand still;32 that is the great juristic
paradox which no legal system has as yet been able to resolve in a
wholly satisfactory manner.
The Supreme Court is thus scarcely subject to valid criticism sim-
ply because it has not adhered slavishly to precedent. The crucial ques-
tion is the quality of the decisions which have been overruled. Where
they have become mere deadwood on the constitutional tree, the Court
is hardly to be blamed if it seizes the opportunity for pruning.
The decisions handed down during the 1977 Term which do not
follow precedent appear to involve just such attempts to remove der-
elicts on the stream of the law. The decisions dealing with state power
over commerce are good examples; two of them declined to follow
precedents which appeared to be controlling. Department of Revenue v.
Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos."3 expressly overruled Puget
Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission34 and held that a state
could constitutionally apply its business and occupation tax to the gross
receipts of a stevedoring company doing business in the state. Ray-
30. The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443,456,458-59 (1851).
In this case, a precedent of twenty-six years was overruled to extend admiralty jurisdiction
from its tide-water definition to encompass all areas of navigable water, including those
inland.
31. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
32. R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1967).
33. 98 S. Ct. 1388 (1978).
34. 302 U.S. 90 (1937). Washington Stevedoring also overruled Joseph v. Carter &
Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1949), a decision that had reaffirmed the rule of
Puget Sound Washington Stevedoring concerned a tax levied by the state of Washington
upon the business of loading and unloading within Washington of vessels engaged in inter-
national and interstate commerce. The prior stevedoring cases had held that stevedoring
itself constituted interstate commerce and as such was not taxable by the states.
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mond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice 5 declined to follow South Car-
olina Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers3 6 and struck down a
state law prohibiting trucks longer than fifty-five feet on its highways,
as applied to an interstate carrier operating sixty-five foot double trailer
units.
The precedents not followed in the Washington Stevedoring and
Raymond Motor cases had become incongruities in commerce clause
jurisprudence. Puget Sound created an unjustified exception to state
power to tax gross receipts.37 A stevedoring company conducts its op-
erations entirely within the state; it is taxed solely on the revenues from
loading and unloading performed in the state in the same manner as all
other businesses earning revenues there are taxed. The tax applied to it
is as fairly related to the services and protection supplied by the state as
it is in the case of all other businesses taxed.31 Immunity for stevedor-
ing companies from a general business tax on all receipts earned in the
state had no constitutional warrant;39 Puget Sound was an anomaly
which had long ago earned its deserved repose.4 0
The same is true, though to a lesser extent, of Barnwell." The
35. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
36. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
37. States generally may tax business activities carried on within their borders. The
occupation of stevedoring, because of its close relation to shipping consisting of loading and
unloading vessels, was characterized as interstate commerce itself, and thus immune from
state taxation. See Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. at 94.
38. Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 98 S. Ct. at 1398-
99. The Washington Stevedoring decision emphasizes that "interstate commerce must bear
its fair share of the state tax burden." Id. at 1399.
39. Id. at 1399. The Court noted that in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274 (1977), the earlier distinction made between direct and indirect taxation of interstate
commerce was discarded, and that the constitutionality of applying a business and occupa-
tion tax to stevedoring under the commerce clause depends upon its practical effect. The test
is set forth as follows: "The Court repeatedly has sustained taxes that are applied to activity
with substantial nexus with the State, that are fairly apportioned, that do not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and that are fairly related to the services provided by the
State." 98 S. Ct. at 1399.
40. Not only was the classification of stevedoring as interstate commerce per se econom-
ically unrealistic in light of the activities carried on wholly within the state, but Joseph v.
Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947), the decision reaffirming Puget
Sound, had also reasoned that multiple tax burdens on interstate commerce could result
from permitting taxation. Washington Stevedoring makes a definitive response to the ab-
straction: "When a general business tax levies only on the value of services performed within
the State, the tax is properly apportioned and multiple burdens logically cannot occur." 98
S. Ct. 1397. See also id. n.17.
41. 303 U.S. 177 (1938). In Barnwell, truckers engaged in interstate transport chal-
lenged a South Carolina law which prohibited the use within the state of trucks whose width
exceeded ninety inches and whose weight when loaded exceeded 20,000 pounds. Although
neighboring states allowed trucks of ninety-six inches and a load of more than ten tons, and
[Vol. 6:1
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decision there has permitted the states to impose a veritable code of
regulations and licensing requirements in areas not covered by the In-
terstate Commerce Act and ICC regulations.42 Raymond Motor does
not expressly overrule Barnwell, but it appears inconsistent with the
Barnwell deference to state motor regulation and, as such, opens the
door to its repudiation.43 Despite the Barnwell attempt to distinguish
these motor regulation cases, one cannot help but feel that separate reg-
despite the fact that up to 90% of all trucks used in interstate commerce were of these dimen-
sions and weights, the South Carolina law was upheld. In the absence of federal regulation
in the field, the Barnwell Court found that the states were free to legislate in the area of state
highways, a matter of traditional local concern. Id. at 187. Particularly where state regula-
tions promote safety upon the highways, they are presumed constitutional. Id. at 189, 195.
The test, therefore, under both the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause, was
whether the state acted within its powers, Ze., was not preempted by federal legislation, and
"whether the means of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought." Id. at
190. The Court refused to apply a balancing of interests test and reviewed the record to
ascertain only "whether it is possible to say that the legislative choice is without rational
basis." Id. at 192.
42. Where Interstate Commerce Commission regulations or the provisions of the Inter-
state Commerce Act (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) apply, the federal laws
supersede any state regulations in the same areas.
43. The state asserted in Raymond Motor that safety considerations dictated the
prohibitions of the statute; therefore, a "rational relation" test should be applied. The regu-
lations were rational, the state argued, because it takes longer to pass longer trucks than
shorter trucks. Overwhelming evidence presented by the interstate shippers demonstrated,
however, that no safety factors dictated the fifty-five foot limit in the statute and that, in fact,
the prohibited trucks were actually safer. The Court therefore held that "the challenged
regulations violate the Commerce Clause because they place a substantial burden on inter-
state commerce and they cannot be said to make more than the most speculative contribu-
tions to highway safety." 434 U.S. at 447.
The Raymond Motor Court reiterated the qualification of the Barnwell language sug-
gesting that no showing of a burden on interstate commerce would be sufficient to invalidate
local safety regulations in the absence of discrimination against interstate commerce. In
contrast to the Barnwell analysis, the body of commerce clause jurisprudence now requires a
balancing approach. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
The Raymond Motor Court approved the balancing approach taken in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., supra, and concluded: "Thus, we cannot accept the State's contention that the
inquiry under the Commerce Clause is ended without a weighing of the asserted safety pur-
pose against the degree of interference with interstate commerce." 434 U.S. at 443.
Although state regulations designed to promote highway safety are entitled to a strong pre-
sumption of validity, the Court found that "this presumption cannot justify a court in clos-
ing its eyes to uncontroverted evidence of record." Id. at 444 n.19. The court carefully
noted, however, that the decision was not dispositive of the fate of all such length limits.
The Court characterized the evidence produced on the safety issue as "overwhelmingly
one-sided.. . . The State of Wisconsin has failed to make even a colorable showing that its
regulations contribute to highway safety." Id. at 447-48. Thus, if a state legitimately "as-
serts the existence of a safety justification for a regulation," it might be upheld, even after
Raymond Motor. See id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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ulation in each state may result in the same "crazy quilt" of state laws,
as that to which the Court pointed with alarm as the inevitable conse-
quence of the Arizona train-limit law stricken down in a leading case.45
In a country dominated by the free-trade concept of the commerce
clause, it is anomalous that interstate commerce by motor, as distinct
from other forms of interstate transportation, may be required to ob-
tain permits and pay tolls every time it crosses a new state line.
Two other 1978 decisions, involving due process and equal protec-
tion issues, also rest on refusals to follow earlier decisions which had
themselves gone too far. The first of them, Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,'
held that the sale under the Uniform Commercial Code of belongings
by a warehouseman for nonpayment of a storage account may not be
considered state action for due process and equal protection purposes.47
Reliance had been placed on, inter alia, Evans v. Newton,48 which had
held that where the tradition of municipal control in the operation of a
park was firmly established, transferring control of the park to private
trustees would not prevent the park's operation from being considered
state action, since the service rendered even by a private park under the
facts of the case was governmental in nature. Flagg rejects the Evans
approach, stating, "We doubt that Newton intended to establish any
such broad doctrine in the teeth of the experience of several American
44. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 388 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
45. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). (Arizona statute limiting
length of passenger trains to fourteen cars and freight trains to seventy cars found invalid as
a safety measure where the necessity of stopping trains at the Arizona border and redistrib-
uting their cars constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce). The Court applied
this test: "The decisive question is whether in the circumstances the total effect of the law as
a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to
outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which
seriously impede it and subject it to local regulation which does not have a uniform effect on
the interstate train journey which it interrupts." Id. at 775-76.
46. 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978).
47. Flagg held that state action was not present because the U.C.C. provision authoriz-
ing the sale did not provide the exclusive means for resolving a purely private dispute and
because there was no state involvement in the warehouseman's sale of the respondent's
goods. 98 S. Ct. at 1735. The rationale of the cases imposing procedural restrictions on
creditors' remedies therefore did not apply. Id. at 1734. Cf. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v.
Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
48. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). Evans held that the managing of a municipal park by the city
council as trustees under the terms of a charitable trust which mandated the exclusion of
non-whites did not cease to be a state activity when the park was subsequently transferred to
private trustees. The services rendered to the community by the park were found municipal
in nature, id. at 301, and the private trustees were endowed by the state, by its delegating the
park management, with powers governmental in nature and thus became agencies of the
state subject to constitutional limitations. Id. at 299.
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entrepreneurs who amassed great fortunes by operating parks for recre-
ational purposes."49
Flagg appears correct in its refusal to accept the broadside Evans
"public function" approach, since, in an era of ever-expanding notions
of the proper scope of governmental action, it appeared to have the
potential of sweeping within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment
most private activities. The state is increasingly undertaking functions
that, not long ago, were thought beyond the legitimate sphere of gov-
ernment. Under the Evans approach, all these functions might be con-
sidered governmental. This would all but do away with the "state
action" requirement for operation of the Fourteenth Amendment since
it "might be spun out to reach privately owned orphanages, libraries,
garbage collection companies, detective agencies, and a host of other
functions commonly regarded as nongovernmental though paralleling
fields of governmental activity ....
The other decision referred to as involving equal protection is Fo-
ley v. Connelie.51 A series of recent decisions had completely changed
the old law on state power to distinguish between citizens and aliens in
fields in which the state had a "special public interest."' 52 The Court
had invalidated state laws barring aliens from the state civil service53 or
giving a preference to citizens in public works employment.54 It had
also struck down state laws prohibiting aliens from practicing law55 or
engineering, 56 as well as laws conditioning eligibility for welfare57 or
educational benefits 8 upon citizenship.
49. 98 S. Ct. 1735 n.8.
50. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. at 322 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
52. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). In cases such as People v. Crane,
214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, afdsub nom. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), and
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), the Court fashioned the doctrine that the state's "special
public interest" in favoring its own citizens over aliens in the distribution of limited re-
sources such as public benefits justified the discriminatory treatment of aliens. Beginning
with Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), however, doubt was cast on
the continuing validity in all contexts of the special public interest doctrine. See Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. at 374. In Graham, the Court rejected the concept that "constitutional
rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privi-
lege.'" Id. The special public interest doctrine was based on the right/privilege dichotomy,
and the prior cases had reasoned that the receipt of privileges could be made dependent
upon citizenship.
53. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
54. Lefkowitz v. C.D.R. Enterprises, Ltd., 429 U.S. 1031 (1977).
55. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
56. Examining Bd. of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
57. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
58. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
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Foley v. Connelie creates a major exception to this line ofjurispru-
dence which had seemed so overwhelmingly established. It holds that
a state may limit appointment of members on the state police force to
citizens. Police officers participate directly in the execution of broad
public policy and so are not to be equated with persons engaged in
routine public employment who exercise no broad power over people
generally.5 9 Although the decisions now extend to aliens the right to
education and welfare, along with the ability to earn a livelihood and
engage in licensed professions, the right to govern may be reserved to
citizens.60 Therefore, while the decisions of the Court with respect to
aliens will continue to reflect fine questions of values, not all limitations
on the rights of aliens will be viewed as inherently suspect and subject
to close scrutiny.
It is to be hoped that Foley will abort the trend toward prohibiting
all state classifications based on citizenship.6' The decisions which
Foley declined to follow had all but rendered irrelevant the circum-
stance that there are factual differences between the alien and the U.S.
citizen that result from the perpetuation by the former of a dual status
as an American inhabitant but a foreign citizen.62 Alienage is essen-
tially a voluntary status under our liberal naturalization laws. In this
respect there is a fundamental difference between citizenship and other
so-called suspect classifications. As a federal judge once stated, "The
governmental body charged with discrimination by the alien can give
Moli~re's classic answer: 'Tu l'as voulu, Georges Dandin.' "63
By way of summary, the discussion in this section indicates that
even the decisions during the 1978 Term that declined to follow prece-
dent did not treat constitutional law as carte blanche upon which the
Court is free to scribble as it pleases. This does not, to be sure, mean
that the high bench no longer overrules precedent. Even the most con-
servative tribunal will find occasion to discard prior decisions. Yet it
does indicate that the often unwarranted repudiation of established
law, which not too long ago caused such distress to lawyers and laymen
alike, is now a thing of the past. Whatever may have been the case
some years ago, decisions of the Court may no longer be classed with
Justice Roberts' restricted railroad ticket--good for this day and train
only.
59. 435 U.S. at 297.
60. Id.
61. See cases cited in notes 52-58 supra.
62. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 585 (1952).
63. Rok v. Legg, 27 F. Supp. 243, 246 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
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In writing of the high Court, the present writer has compared it to
a tapestry made up of many strands which, interwoven, make a pattern;
to separate a single one and look at it alone not only destroys the whole
but gives the strand itself a false value.' In the main, the commen-
taries which follow this foreword examine the single strands of individ-
ual decisions. But their real significance lies in their contribution to the
weaving of the institutional pattern. It is to this pattern that this section
is devoted. Here we are dealing not so much with individual decisions
as with the Court itself as an institution during the 1977 Term.
It does not require the acumen of one for whom the United States
Reports constitute his staple reading to realize that there is something
amiss in our highest judicial institution. What is particularly distres-
sing to one who studies the Court in operation is the apparent failure of
its members to act with a full realization of the fact that the strength of
the high tribunal arises from its operation as a collegiate institution. A
court vested with the awesome powers entrusted to our highest bench
can function effectively only if it speaks as an organic entity. If it
voices merely the individual views of its members, the authority of its
pronouncements can never be quite the same. In recent years, as is well
known, the institutional ethos of the Court has been weak. "The fact
is," wrote Justice Jackson just before his death, "that the Court func-
tions less as one deliberative body than as nine."65 Since this was writ-
ten, there has, if anything, been an intensification in the internal
atomization of the Court.
The 1977 Term has seen no diminution in this tendency. Certainly
there has been no decrease in the readiness of the Justices to articulate
their individual views in concurrences or dissents.66 Almost every case
of importance last Term saw a sharp division in the Court. The present
Justices express disagreement with their colleagues with an alacrity that
would have shocked earlier Courts. Even with the dissent and the con-
currence conceded to have a proper place, one may wonder whether
the Justices have not, in recent years, made too great a use of their right
to differ publicly. Every right can be abused, and the right of members
of the Supreme Court to express disagreement with their colleagues is
no exception. Just after his elevation to the Court, Justice Frankfurter
64. B. SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT 342 (1957).
65. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
16 (1955).
66. Notable is the diversity of opinions in the Bakke case, discussed above. See notes
14-17 & 23 supra.
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stated, in a concurring opinion, "The volume of the Court's business
has long since made impossible the early healthy practice whereby the
Justices gave expression to individual opinions."'67 If carried to its ex-
treme, the right to concur or dissent leads back, in effect, to the practice
of the pre-Marshall Court of seriatim opinions. Yet this is, in truth,
what seems to have been happening in the Supreme Court of the past
few decades.
Notwithstanding Justice Frankfurter's already-quoted statement,
one may doubt whether the proliferation of Supreme Court opinions is
a "healthy" development. Without a doubt, it has a direct, adverse ef-
fect upon the respect in which the Court and the law are held. The
supreme bench is identified in the public mind as the authoritative ex-
pounder of American law. Anything that detracts from the esteem in
which the highest tribunal is held cannot but reflect adversely upon the
law throughout the land. In our system, as already indicated, the
Supreme Court is clothed with much of the panoply and prestige that
the ancients associated with their religious oracles. But even the Oracle
at Delphi could not long retain the allegiance of men if it spoke with up
to nine inconsistent voices.
Closely related to the profusion of Supreme Court opinions has
been the decline in their quality. It is certainly unrealistic to expect a
Holmes or a Cardozo, for example, to sit on every Supreme Court. But
does that mean that the highest bench must be the characteristic institu-
tion of an age that Dean Acheson called just before his death "the
apotheosis of mediocrity"?68 Cardozo once noted that people assert
that "a judicial opinion has no business to be literature."69 Does it,
however, follow that it has no business being literate?
The Court, like the country, has become so result-oriented that its
devotion to legal craftsmanship has been skewed. Too many recent
opinions are deficient even in adequately explaining their bases.70 Too
many tend to be homilies in political science. Their language is turgid
and verbose; their reasoning prolix and obscure. Too often, they ignore
the distinction between obiter and ratio and the appropriate weight to
67. Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
68. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1971, at 45.
69. SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo 339 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
70. For a striking example, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). It was of this type of opinion that Justice
Jackson wrote his caustic animadversion: "I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain
meant when he said, 'The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it!' SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 214 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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be given to different types of legal and non-legal authority. "We must
know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say
whether it is right or wrong," reads the oft-quoted Cardozo statement.
7
'
Observers of the high Court in operation are equally entitled to know
just what its decisions mean. Of course, as Alice's king said, "If there's
no meaning in it, that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't
try to find any."7 2 But this hardly seems a proper method for an ulti-
mate judicial tribunal to follow-at least not this side of Wonderland.
Conclusion
Former Solicitor General Bork has recently tilted a lance against
the continuing trend toward judicial activism. The role of the judge, he
urges, should be to "let elected representatives make the value judg-
ments not rather clearly already made by the Constitution. . . . That
means abandoning power judges could exercise and-being
human-would like to exercise." 73 Instead, he says of the Supreme
Court, "the trend.. . is toward a more dominant, imperialistic institu-
tion than the court was forty years ago."74
Certainly judicial activism did not end with the Warren Court.
Far from it! The Court today exercises powers vis-a-vis the other
branches that would have appeared unthinkable only a quarter of a
century ago. The doctrine of judicial self-restraint, of which Justice
Frankfurter was for many years the foremost advocate, now appears a
principle from another world. The judicial referee, whose task it is to
keep the ring free from governmental action that passes the bounds of
reason, has been replaced by a present-day version of the super-legisla-
ture,75 acting as Supreme Censor "to judge the wisdom or desirability
of legislative policy determinations. 76
Critics of the Court, on and off the bench, have pointed out the
similarities between the present Court's free-wheeling use of concepts
such as due process and that employed by the Nine Old Men during
the first part of this century. What is it that the pre-1937 Court had
done which virtually all now condemn? It was the elevation by the
Justices of their own personal predilections into constitutional dogmas
71. United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935).
72. L. CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND.
73. YALE L. REP. 10-11 (Spring 1978).
74. Id.
75. The famous phrase of Brandeis, J., dissenting in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264
U.S. 504, 534 (1924).
76. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
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that could not be touched by the legislature. True, the old Court's ac-
tion in that respect was almost entirely limited to the economic field;
yet that was so because it was in that field that legislative action was
threatening to upset the Justices' preconceptions. Today, all the mem-
bers of the Court would find the economic philosophy that prevailed on
the pre-1937 tribunal anachronistic. None of the present Justices has
difficulty in accepting a need for government regulation that would
have seemed all but revolutionary to the old Court majority. In the
area of economic legislation, then, self-restraint accords with the per-
sonal convictions of the present Court. The same is not true in the area
of personal regulation. Here, legislative restrictions run counter to the
libertarian predilections of a majority of the Court. But are these Jus-
tices necessarily more justified in writing their private predilections into
the Constitution than were their pre-1937 predecessors? "The great or-
dinances of the Constitution," declared Justice Holmes in a celebrated
passage, "do not establish and divide fields of black and white."" Nor
does the organic instrument differentiate qualitatively between the dif-
ferent provisions that make up its text. As no constitutional guaranty
enjoys preference, the Justices are not justified in selective application
of the Constitution, giving full effect only to those parts which for the
moment find personal favor with individual Justices.78
Nor is it enough to say that we can safely allow the Supreme Court
to intervene actively only in cases involving personal rights. In the first
place, as the Court itself has recognized, "the dichotomy between per-
sonal liberties and property rights is a false one. . . . In fact, a funda-
mental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and
the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the
other."7 9 It may well be that protection of personal rights is the area
that for the moment finds favor. But are we justified in assuming that
the preponderance on the Court will always be with those who are of
the present Justices' persuasion? As Justice Frankfurter once put it,
Yesterday the active area in this field was concerned with "prop-
erty." Today it is "civil liberties." Tomorrow it may again be
"property." Who can say that in a society with a mixed econ-
omy, like ours, these two areas are sharply separated, and that
certain freedoms in relation to property may not again be
deemed, as they were in the past, aspects of individual
freedom?"0
77. Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
78. Accord, Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1956).
79. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
80. F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 19 (1956).
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Unrestrained judicial activism today, on matters of civil liberty, opens
the door to similar activism tomorrow, in areas which may happen then
to find favor.
It is not mere caviling to point out that judicial predisposition to-
ward the libertarian result may be a two-edged sword. Properly em-
ployed, it can maintain the essential balance between liberty and
authority. Carried to an activist extreme, however, it can lead the
judges to assume undue authority over the other branches. It should
not be forgotten that, no matter how we may gloss over it, judicial re-
view is basically an undemocratic institution. Through exercise of its
review power, the Supreme Court may enable the will of even the great
majority of the people to be frustrated. That this is no mere theoretical
possibility is shown by what actually happened in the pre-1937 period.
The Court then consistently set at naught policies which most of the
country approved of, and it did so by resort to constitutional theories
that we now see had clearly become outmoded. The Supreme Court is
essentially a check of the past upon the present. But it is the present
that represents the will of the people and it is that will that must ulti-
mately be given effect in a democracy. If the democratic bases of our
system are to be respected, the review power of the one non-democratic
organ in our government should be exercised with self-restraint.
It is paradoxical that those who profess to be the preachers of pres-
ent-day liberalism now assert the need for the Court to assume a more
active responsibility. If there was one principle that nineteenth-century
liberals agreed upon, it was that of the primacy of legislative power. To
them, it was the elected representatives of the people, not an irresponsi-
ble judicial organ, who were endowed with primacy in the governmen-
tal structure. Yet, whatever else we may think of the tenets of
nineteenth-century liberalism, is this not the proper distribution of gov-
ernmental power in a representative democracy? Laws duly enacted by
the people's representatives should not be aborted by judicial fiat un-
less the judges are presented with no other choice in the matter. As
Marshall aptly said, "The people made the Constitution, and the peo-
ple can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only by their
will." It is the Supreme Court's responsibility to see that their will is
faithfully executed in the determination of controversies.
There are those, however, who fear that judicial deference toward
the legislature tends to leave us unprotected against violations of con-
stitutional rights. To them, the Court is the only real bulwark of our
81. Marshall, C.J., quotedin 309 U.S. at xv (1940).
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liberties; if it removes itself from the center of the constitutional stage,
our only substantial safeguard will be gone. The present writer would
be the last to denigrate our highest tribunal and the cardinal task it
performs in a democratic system such as ours. But to overmagnify the
role of the Court is to perform neither it nor the country a service. It
was with profound insight that one of the greatest of modem jurists,
Judge Learned Hand, declared in a passage that has become deservedly
famous:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much
upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false
hopes, believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts
of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law,
no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do
much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no
law, no court to save it.82
Though Judge Hand's comment may seem to some too pessimistic
a gospel of despair, it contains a fundamental truth about the proper
constitutional role of the Supreme Court. Courts are not the only in-
struments of government that can be relied upon to preserve us against
harm. If they were, they would be largely inadequate for the purpose.
Civil liberties can at best draw only limited strength from judicial guar-
antees. Courts can hardly be expected by themselves to preserve us
against our own excesses. It is no idle speculation to inquire which
comes first, judicial enforcement of constitutional rights or a free and
tolerant society. Must we, in Justice Jackson's question, first maintain
a system of free government to assure a free and independent judiciary,
or can we rely upon an aggressive, activist judiciary to guarantee free
government? 83 Americans not infrequently forget the answer to this
question. Without a doubt, the Court is of basic importance, particu-
larly in molding public opinion to accept fully the implications of the
rule of law; the law enunciated by it may play the role of Plato's "lead-
ing-string."8 4 As such, it can have a definite educative as well as a nor-
mative effect. But it is the attitude of the society and of its organized
political forces, rather than of its purely legal machinery alone, that is
the controlling force in the character of free institutions.
82. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (3d ed. 1960).
83. R. JACKSON, supra note 65, at 81.
84. See Schwartz, OfAdministrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, the Laws and
Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 443, 452 (1977).
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